The paper assesses the impact of overall inequality, as well as inequality among the poor and among the rich, on the growth rates along various percentiles of the income distribution. The analysis uses micro-census data from U.S. states covering the period from 1960 to 2010. The paper finds evidence that high levels of inequality reduce the income growth of the poor and, if anything, help the growth of the rich. When inequality is deconstructed into bottom and top inequality, the analysis finds that it is mostly top inequality that is holding back growth at the bottom.
Introduction
Does high inequality today bode well for future rates of income growth? This question has recently acquired added relevance because of the slowdown of growth in rich countries and simultaneously rising inequality.
The relationship between inequality and growth has been extensively researched empirically in the 1980s and 1990s with interest declining afterwards.
2 Unfortunately, the results ultimately proved to be inconclusive as the relationship was found weak and of uncertain sign.
Forbes (2000), using a panel of mostly rich countries, found that higher inequality was positively associated with growth; so did . Forbes (2000) however found that the relationship was weakened (or could turn negative) when the time-length of the growth spells was increased. Other studies before her in fact had predominantly reported on a negative association, see e.g. Persson and Tabellini (1991) , Alesina and Rodrik (1994) , and Perotti (1996) . 3 In Barro (2000) and Banerjee and Duflo (2003) the baseline results were largely inconclusive. Although both studies ultimately did establish a more intricate relationship when delving deeper; Barro (2000) reported a negative correlation for a subsample of low income countries, while Banerjee and Duflo (2003) found evidence of a non-linear relationship.
Recently, Voitchovsky (2005) and Rodriguez (2012, 2013) have had some success by showing that total inequality is built up of different components that may each have their own relationship to growth.
2 For reviews of the inequality-growth literature, see e.g. Aghion et al. (1999) and Bénabou (1996a) . 3 More recently, Benjamin et al. (2011) found empirical evidence of a negative relationship between inequality and subsequent growth at the village level in rural China. However, they report that the effect disappears when regressing growth on more recent observations of inequality. Voitchovsky (2005) separately evaluates inequality among the poor and among the rich, and concludes that bottom inequality (that is, inequality among the poor) is bad for growth while top inequality is good. Rodriguez (2012, 2013) measure how much may be attributed to inequality of opportunity (estimated to be inequality due to "inherited" characteristics such as gender, race or parental background) and treat the residual inequality as a measure of inequality of efforts. In two separate applications, one to the EU and one to the US, they find that inequality of opportunity is detrimental to growth while inequality of efforts tends to help growth.
Despite the intuitive appeal, other studies have since failed to reproduce these results when applied to data for other countries; see e.g. Ferreira et al. (2014) .
Remarkably, all of the above mentioned studies focus exclusively on growth of average incomes or GDP per capita. This seems rather paradoxical.
Measures of inequality summarize at any given point in time how incomes are distributed across the population. Yet when we investigate inequality's relationship to income growth we appear only interested in how it might affect growth of the average income, not how it might affect growth rates at various parts of the distribution. One would think that we would specifically be interested in how individuals at different steps of the socio-economic ladder would fare in societies with different levels of inequality.
Indeed, the logical next step is to also disaggregate growth, and to verify whether income growths of the poor and the rich are affected differently by inequality. We explore this empirical question using data for the United States covering the period 1960 to 2010 (at 10 year intervals).
Specifically, we regress total inequality as well as bottom and top inequality against growth at a wide range of percentiles of the income distribution. Our results are both conclusive and robust.
We find that high overall inequality only appears to hurt income growth of the poor. When inequality is found to have a positive effect on growth, this positive effect is exclusively reserved for the top end of the income distribution. This means that the type of growth that inequality stimulates is the type that further advances inequality. As such, our study may offer a new perspective on the persistent rise in inequality in the United
States in recent decades. It also offers an alternative explanation for why the relationship between average income growth and inequality is so fragile, as the negative and the positive effects from the different ends of the income distribution may cancel each other out.
When we distinguish between bottom and top inequality, by regressing these two inequalities on growth rates of different percentiles of the income distribution, we find that it is mostly top inequality that is holding back growth at the bottom. One possible explanation for this observation is that high levels of top inequality serve as a proxy for "social separatism"
where the rich lobby for policies that benefit themselves but ultimately limit the growth opportunities of the poor.
There may be other explanations that we cannot discard at this stage.
The literature on wage inequality for example attributes the rise in inequality in recent decades in part to skill-based technological change and international trade (or off-shoring) which have put pressure on the wages of lower-skilled workers and increased the relative demand for higher-skilled workers (and hence their wages), see e.g. Autor et al. (2008) , Kierzenkowski and Koske (2012) , and Autor and Dorn (2013) . If these technological changes and off-shoring are correlated with inequality, then this may denote an alternative channel via which lagged inequality can be associated with lower income growth for the poor and higher income growth for the rich.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. A brief overview of the literature is provided in Section 2. In Section 3 we discuss the source of data we use and explain how we "disaggregate" both inequality and growth.
Section 4 offers a first look at the data. The empirical results, and a discussion of their significance, are presented in Section 5. In the same section we also present an inductively-derived tentative hypothesis linking inequality and growth. Section 6 provides some robustness checks, and Section 7 concludes.
Brief discussion of the existing inequality-growth literature
Early thinking was that inequality would be positively associated with growth. The theoretical arguments originally put forward by Kaldor (1956) for example viewed income inequality as necessary in order to provide for savings (only the rich would save), and thus key for capital accumulation and economic growth. Another possible argument for a positive association is that more unequal societies provide stronger incentives which ultimately motivate individuals to work harder in order to succeed. These arguments found support in the empirical studies by Forbes (2000) and . 4 Forbes (2000) findings, however, were rather nuanced as she found that, in short-time spans of about 5 years, inequality appears positively related to growth, but over longer horizons (10 years or more) negatively.
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Other schools of thought have since argued for a negative relationship between initial inequality and subsequent growth. One strand of this 4 The authors were criticized for exclusion of many developing countries and small number of observations (a problem particularly acute in a dynamic panel setting), econometric procedures, and inadequate inequality statistics (see e.g. Aghion, Carolli and Garcia-Peñalosa 1999; Malinen, 2007) . The latter is something, of course, the authors could not help: it simply reflected the existing statistical basis at the time.
literature appeals to the Meltzer-Richard's (1981 , 1983 ) median voter hypothesis. Studies believed to have uncovered empirical support for this hypothesis include Persson and Tabellini (1991) , Alesina and Rodrik (1994), and Perotti (1996) . 6 It is argued that high inequality leads a relatively poor median voter to vote for high tax rates, which in turn reduce incentives for investment and cause low growth. 7 However, one could argue that a poor median voter might also vote for redistributive policies that are not necessarily bad for growth, as for example, investments in public education.
8 Li, Squire and Zou (1998) and Oded Galor in a number of papers, some of which were co-authored by Omer Moav (see Galor, 2009; Galor and Moav 2004 ) put the emphasis on credit market imperfections, namely the inability of the poor to get loans to finance their education. Therefore, absent a deep financial market, inequality would lead to lower growth. This view was, in the case of Galor and Moav, integrated with their overall argument that, in modern societies, the key to fast growth is not capital accumulation but improvements in human capital. This explained, in their view, why the relationship between inequality and growth historically switched from being positive in the past to being negative more recently. Barro (2000) found the relationship between inequality and growth to be inconclusive. When he split his sample into a low income-and a highincome sample, the results revealed a negative relationship for low income countries and a borderline positive, if any, relationship between inequality 6 Other authors (Keefer and Knack, 2002) looked at a link between inequality and political instability which would depress investments and economic growth. 7 These results too raised a number of questions. For example, the studies do not adequately distinguish between inequality of market income which determines the median voter's position in the distribution and thus her desired tax rate, and inequality of disposable income which is the end product of the tax-and-transfer redistribution (for a critique see Milanovic 2000) . It should be noted however that the micro household data, needed to get the distribution of market income, were seldom available. 8 Ostry et al. (2014) , in a recent study on redistribution, inequality and growth, also note that equality-enhancing interventions need not necessarily be bad for growth.
and growth for high income countries. (One might argue that inefficiencies such as credit market imperfections are more likely to play a role in developing countries than in high income countries.) Banerjee and Duflo (2003) also failed to obtain conclusive results from their linear specifications, which prompted them to explore non-linear alternatives. They concluded that all departures from the existing inequality towards either more or less inequality were associated with lower growth, and the greater the change in inequality, the greater the negative effect on growth. This result is perhaps somewhat surprising as it seems to imply that each country is, at least in the short-run, at optimal inequality. 9 The debate on the relationship between inequality and growth became more quiescent after such inconclusiveness.
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Recently there have been some successes in getting a better handle on the relationship between inequality and growth. Voitchovsky (2005) and Rodriguez (2012, 2013) argue that inequality ultimately consists of different components, some of which may be bad for growth, and others good. Once this is acknowledged, the earlier inconclusive results with "signswitching" become more intelligible. Since different components may have opposite effects on growth and we fail to measure which one is more important at a given time and place, it is plausible that the effect of "total inequality" on growth can vary. This approach gets away from looking at how a single inequality measure is associated with a single growth measure ("oneon-one" approach) to a "two (inequality measures) -on-one (growth measure)" approach, and can ultimately lead to an n-on-n approach.
Voitchovsky (2005) evaluates inequality among the poor (the 50/10 ratio) and inequality among the rich (the 90/50 ratio) as two separate 9 The Banerjee-Duflo model is of a median voter hypothesis type. 10 A useful meta-study of the inequality and growth literature is by de Dominicis, de Groot and Florax (2006) .
inequalities. 11 She concludes that bottom inequality is bad for growth while top inequality is good. It is hypothesized that bottom inequality is bad for growth because it implies higher levels of poverty which, in the presence of credit constraints, make it difficult for the poor to acquire education. 12 It might also lead to greater crime and social instability. On the other hand, a positive impact of top inequality on growth is regarded as supporting a classic theoretical argument that links higher inequality to higher savings which finance growth-enhancing investments. It seems reasonable that this argument applies mostly to top income inequality, as opposed to total-or bottom inequality, as a large share of aggregate savings are made by the rich.
In this way, Voitchovsky basically reconciled three very common theories that linked inequality and growth and were often presented as alternatives:
credit-constraints, political instability, and marginal propensity to save by the rich. According to Voitchovsky, they may be all true, but are best captured by different parts of the income distribution. Rodriguez (2012, 2013) decompose total inequality into inequality due to inequality of opportunity, that is, to the circumstances outside one's control such as parental education, race, being foreign-born, and the residual, assumed to be due to effort and luck. In two separate applications, one to the European Union member countries and one to the states of the US, they find strong evidence that levels of inequality of opportunity are negatively correlated with growth while the residual ("good inequality") helps growth.
The evolution of data has played an important role in shaping the empirical inequality-growth literature. A lack of conclusive results may in part 11 Voitchovsky (2005) uses standardized micro data from 81 surveys covering 21 rich countries, in a dynamic panel setting with five-year intervals coinciding broadly with survey data availability. 12 See also the recent study by Ravallion (2012) who directly compares the effects of initial poverty and inequality levels on future growth.
be attributed to the limitations of the data that were available at the time.
At best, after the much-used Deininger Squire (1996) for many countries only at long and uneven intervals. 13 The dramatic improvements in data quality and availability, both through household surveys and fiscal data on top incomes, have made it possible to deconstruct inequality and its relationship to growth.
The data and regression framework
We use individual level data from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Survey (IPUMS) which is a large micro-census conducted once per decade (see Ruggles et al., 2010) . We use six surveys made over the period of 50 years at regular decennial intervals : in 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000 and 2010 Our analysis is conducted at the level of US states. 15 We define as poor all individuals who belong to the bottom 40% of state population ranked by disposable household per capita income and as rich all those belonging to the top 40%. These are sufficiently wide partitions to include a large portion of total inequality and also to have arguably a meaningful impact on growth.
Growth will be measured in anonymous terms because the surveys are not longitudinal and we do not have information about household per capita income for the same persons over several periods. Empirically, we ask in effect, two related questions. First, in a one-on-n formulation, how does the overall Gini at time t-1 affect the growth rate at different percentiles of income distribution between times t-1 and t? (The times t-1 and t are, as indicated, always ten years apart.) And second, in a more flexible formulation, two-on-n, how do inequalities among the poor and the rich at 15 One advantage of working with a single country, with data from a single source, is that the data are comparable between units of observation. On the other hand, a single country may not offer the same degree of heterogeneity as a cross-country database does, which means that by lowering the "noise" we may also be lowering the "signal". This does not appear to be an issue in the United States. We observe a large degree of variation in both inequality levels and growth patterns between the different states.
time t-1 affect the growth rate at different percentiles between times t-1 and
t?
The regression for a given income distribution partition i (where i refers here to the poor π or the rich ρ but can obviously be made more general) is written as in (1).
( 1) , ( ) is the growth rate at a given percentile p in state s between time t-1 or t, that is: is overall state Gini. But in a more complex formulation, two-on-n, the regression is estimated across percentile growth rates for both Ginis (that is, for the Gini for the poor and for the rich).
We use several state-level controls: "age015" and "age65" (the percentage of the population aged 15 or younger and aged 65 or older), "edu_ms_age2139" (percentage with a graduate degree among individuals 16 We also considered selected income percentile ratios as alternative measures for top and bottom inequality, which yielded qualitatively similar results.
between 21 and 39 years of age), "edushort1518" (education "shortfall" for those between the ages of 15 and 18, as explained above), "olf_female"
(percentage of women aged between 24 and 65 who are not part of the labor force), and region or state dummies. 17 Demographics, education and labour force participation are commonly included as controls in growth regressions.
Our specific choice of education and labour force participation variables is perhaps somewhat distinct. A popular control for education is the percentage of individuals above a certain age with a high school degree. We use two controls for education, and focus on a narrower (younger) age group and a narrower (higher) education range (graduate degree). Our primary education control measures what percentage of young adults between the age of 21
and 39 have a graduate degree. Our second control measures how far children between the age of 15 and 18 have fallen behind in school, which is not commonly included in growth regressions. We included it because we think it may help capture the multiple dimensions at play when it comes to education. Where the first variable is a measure of human capital, the second variable (or the two variables combined) we believe serves as a proxy for (lack of) opportunity, i.e. parental education, the quality of primary and secondary school, the "quality" of the community etc. The focus on narrower age groups and education levels is also deliberate. It has as an advantage that the variables exhibit more variation over time, which is particularly an advantage in the fixed effect regressions. (High school attainment for individuals above 21, say, tends to be highly persistent and hence highly colinear with the state fixed effects.) A similar motivation underlies our choice for female labour force participation as opposed to total labour force participation. The former exhibits considerably more variation over time than the latter (and hence carries more information up and above the state fixed effects).
Three different formulations of (1) are considered: pooled regression with four US regional dummies (East, Mid-West, South, and West), (2) generalized method of moments, or system GMM shown as part of our robustness checks, and (3) fixed-effects across individual states.
Note that we could in principle push this all the way to an n-on-n approach, where one could look at how inequality at each percentile of income distribution affects growth at every percentile of the income distribution. But pushing disaggregation too far has its costs: we would leave out the between-percentile inequality which is, when the partitions are fine, by far the most important part of total inequality. Empirically, inequality within each percentile (except for the very bottom and the very top) 18 is very small, and it could be hard to argue that it may affect growth at its own percentile or, for that matter, any other.
Therefore the disaggregation level has to be reasonably wide to include enough inequality and also to provide a credible causal narrative whereby inequality around one part of the distribution may affect growth at that or another part of the distribution. We do this by separating total inequality into inequality among the bottom of the income distribution (bottom 40%) and inequality among the top 40% of the population and then allowing bottom and top inequality to have different effects along different points of the income distribution.
An overview of income distribution changes in the US
Tables 1 (and WA1-WA2 in the Annex) show some key summary statistics. Table 1 it was 2.9 percent per capita in the 1960s, then 1.5% and 1.6% in the two next ten-year periods, 1.1% in the 1990s, and practically zero in the noughts.
The switch to pro-rich growth can be observed from a simple comparison of growth rates at the top and bottom percentiles (i.e. by comparing the 5 th to the 95 th percentile, say). A striking illustration of the change in levels and shape of growth rates is provided in Figure 1 which displays the patterns of growth in the 1960 and in the 1990s. 20 In the 1960s, GIC was mostly downward sloping indicating that growth rates were higher at lower parts of the income distribution (in effect, the highest growth rate was registered for the bottom 5% of the population). In 1990s, by contrast, growth rates are lower than in the 1960s everywhere except at the top, and the line is upward sloping. Figure 2 shows the same GIC but disaggregated by region: North-East, Mid-West, South, and the West (see Table A1 in the Annex for a definition of these regions). This tells us that while all regions are showing an upward sloping GIC in recent years, not all regions experienced pro-poor growth in the early years. In the North-East and the West, growth increased with income in both periods. Table WA2 shows the Gini coefficients for the bottom 40% and top 40% of the population over the same half-a-century and across 50 states and the District of Columbia. The general trend is that top inequality has been rising faster than bottom inequality. We can notice the effect of the recent financial crisis which has reduced heterogeneity (inequality) among top Table 2 is defined as percentage of the male/female population outside the labor force.) Fifty years later we see a remarkable convergence; this gender gap has almost disappeared. We also see evidence of aging in the population with a steady decline in the share of children combined with a gradual rise in the share of elderly. All of these factors help explain income growth, and will be included as candidate control variables in our growth regressions.
Results and a hypothesis
We move next to the results. The first set of results (Table 3) is for the one-on-n formulation, namely a formulation where we look at the effect of overall Gini on growth along many points of income distribution for all US states (we drop however Alaska and DC which are both identified as outliers). 22 We run regional fixed-effects (FE) regressions where we control for unobservable characteristics using four geographical regions: Mid-West, South, West and (omitted in the regression) East.
23 22 We identified DC and Alaska as outliers using standard regression diagnostics. 23 One argument in favour of working with region-as opposed to state-fixed effects (FE) is that inequality tends to be a slow-moving process, which makes it highly correlated with FE at the state level. Hence, by adopting state FE estimators one risks throwing the baby out with the bathwater. An advantage of working with state level FE of course is that it is more ambitious in controlling for omitted variables. We will present the System GMM estimates in Section 6, while the standard state FE formulation can be found in the Annex.
Overall, initial inequality is negatively associated (at the conventional level of statistical significance) with subsequent real growth for the population located below the 25 th percentile, and positively with growth for the population belonging to the top decile. The size of the (positive) coefficient increases as we move toward the richer parts of the top decile, and likewise, the absolute size of the negative coefficient increases as we move toward the poorest parts of the distribution. In other words, total inequality seems to be negatively associated with growth among the poorest people and positively among the top decile while there is no statistically significant effect on growth among middle income earners.
Let us also inspect the effects associated with our controls. Since the results on these controls do not vary much between this and other formulations, we shall discuss them only here in some detail. Predictably, the increase in the share of household members who are either too young (age015) or too old (age65) to work has a negative effect on income growth for all income percentiles, and in most cases, the effect is statistically significant. Table 1 ), the decline in state-level Gini would, on average, double their growth rate. Both the absolute and relative effect of lower inequality on real growth of the rich is less: one-standard deviation decrease in Gini is associated with a 0.3 percentage point decline in the growth rate of the rich which given that their average annual growth over the entire period was almost 2 percent is just about 1/7 th of their growth rate.
Finally, the effects of overall Gini on the middle of states' income distributions is, whether positive or negative, small and statistically insignificant. Throughout, the adjusted R 2 is relatively high, ranging from 0.73 to 0.88, and increasing for higher income percentiles. In conclusion, we find that overall inequality, measured by Gini, has a different impact on income growth of the rich and the poor. The results for a more complex two-on-n (here: two-on-8) formulation are shown in Table 4 . We replace the overall state Gini by two Ginis: one for the bottom 40% of the states' populations ("the bottom Gini"), and the other for the top 40% of the states' populations ("the top Gini"). The bottom Gini has a negative impact on income growth among the poorest (bottom 10%), and a positive impact on growth among the top 10%. In effect, its coefficient almost monotonically increases, starting with a high negative and statistically significant value (for the poorest income group) and ending with a strongly positively significant and big coefficient at the very top of income distribution. Consider now the top Gini. It is negatively associated with the growth between the 10 th percentile and the median, and is statistically insignificant in the upper half of the distribution.
How sizeable are these effects? At the level of the 10 th percentile, one standard deviation increase in top Gini (from the average value of 0.266 to 0.296), reduces annual per capita growth rate by almost 0.5 percentage points. This is a sizeable effect since the average annual growth over 50 years at that point of income distribution was less than 1 percent (Table 1) . But inequality among the poor affects positively growth rate of the rich. The standard deviation of bottom Gini is 0.025 and its increase would raise the growth rate of the rich by about 0.2 percentage point per annum, which is about 1/10 th of the average growth rate of the rich over the 50-year period.
The adjusted R 2 is, as before, between 0.73 and 0.88 and greater for higher income percentiles.
What are the channels whereby inequality may affect negatively the growth rate of the poor and positively the growth rate of the rich? We cannot test them, so we are reduced to simply discussing some hypotheses. A possibility which seems to us most compelling is that inequality in general, and among the rich in particular, is an indicator of societal fragmentation. We view it similarly to the ethnolinguistic fragmentation that was interpreted as a cause of conflicts and in many cases was found to correlate with civil strife (see the review in Hegre and Sambanis, 2006) . Alike ethnic fragmentation that creates "horizontal" cleavages between the groups, income fragmentation creates "vertical" cleavages between the poor, middle class and the rich. These cleavages particularly strongly, and negatively, affect the poor. This might promote "social separatism" whereby the rich prefer to opt out of publicly-funded and publicly-provided education, health, urban infrastructure and other services because their private equivalents may be of better quality and signal the wealth and power of those who can afford them.
One example of this is the vastly different preferences of the rich (top 1%) and the rest of the population when it comes to the cuts in Medicare, education and infrastructure spending as a way to reduce federal deficit.
According to the survey data reported by Page, Bartels and Seawright (2011; quoted in West, 2014, p. 10) , 58% of the rich are in favor of such cuts versus only 21% among the rest of the population. 25 Gilens and Page (2014) confirm that the preferences of the rich are ultimately more likely to determine public policy than the preferences of the majority, at least in the United States:
"When the preferences of economic elites and the stands f organized interest groups are controlled for, the preferences of the average American appear to have only a minuscule, near-zero, statistically non-significant impact upon public policy."
"Social separatism" means that the poor, especially the bottom decile, may find it harder to escape poverty because with rich's lack of interest in public health and education, the quality of the services deteriorates. It is a 25 Using cross-country data from the Americas, Sokoloff and Zolt (2005) find empirically that higher levels of inequality are associated with more regressive taxes and consequently less funding for public investments and services. In a study of the US federal tax system, Piketty and Saez (2007) provide evidence that over the last 40 to 50 years, since the 1960s, the federal tax system has evolved from being progressive toward being regressive. It is reported that the marginal tax rate on the highest incomes, for example, has declined from 91 percent around 1960 to 35 percent in 2003. This remarkable decline has been accompanied by an equally remarkable upward trend in income inequality. Alvaredo et al. (2013) put the coevolution of top income shares and top tax rates into a more global perspective. For further empirical evidence that inequality also acts as a barrier to the provision of public goods, see e.g. Araujo et al. (2008) and Easterly (2007) . This does not mean that none of the economic benefits trickles down to lower incomes. An inspection of the unconditional growth incidence curves in Section 4 shows that the lower incomes have also participated in growth, albeit not as much as the top incomes. Rather our findings suggest that the "trickle-down effect" is larger in states or times that can be characterized by lower levels of inequality. This is also implied by the recent results by Chetty et al. (2014, p. 38) , that show that locations in the U.S. with lower income inequality display more inter-generational mobility.
It is harder to see why inequality among the poor would have a positive effect on the growth rate of the rich. This is a more speculative part.
Segmentation among the poor can ensure that the rich are provided some 26 See also the studies by e.g. Bénabou (1996b) , Alesina and La Ferrara (2000) , and Lloyd-Ellis (2000).
services and amenities at cheaper rates than they would pay if the poor were more homogeneous and thus politically more influential. In other words, the poor who have a choice between facing destitution and being willing to work for a very low remuneration may prefer the latter. Segmentation among the poor, some of which may be also due to them being non-documented aliens, creates perhaps what Marx called "the reserve army of the unemployed" which may be conveniently used to improve real incomes of the rich.
We are aware that if our results were to hold indefinitely, then states are predicted to grow increasingly more unequal over time with nothing to stop it. This is obviously not realistic. We believe that the system can best be viewed as a local approximation and that the results apply to the time period under consideration. Our regression model abstracts away from any correcting forces; it is plausible that some feedback forces kick in when inequality is gets particularly high (or low). Such corrections may act however on a longer time-scale. Furthermore, some of the other explanatory variables that are part of the model (and are correlated with inequality) too may provide countervailing forces.
Robustness checks
In this Section we present briefly several robustness checks of our results. A couple of others are relegated to the Annex. Tables 5 and 6 present the same results as Tables 3 and 4 (that is, for respectively total Gini, and bottom and top Ginis) using system GMM estimation. System GMM is useful in dynamic panels like ours as it aims to address simultaneously the omitted variable bias and endogeneity, and exploits the variation of growth rates over time in each state as well as inter-state variation (see Blundell and Bond, 1998) . Note that both state-and time fixed effects are controlled for. All explanatory variables (lagged income, lagged inequality but also all controls) are treated as endogenous variables. All lags of the covariates except the first lag are used in building instruments. Principal Component Analysis is adopted to limit the instrument count in an effective manner (see e.g. Roodman, 2009 Roodman, , 2012 . The standard errors are derived from the robust estimator of the covariance matrix. Note: All right-hand side variables estimated at time t-1. Income is household per capita. Gini calculated across individuals ranked by their household per capita income. t-statistics in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Time-period dummies are included but not reported.
As before, the overall Gini (Table 5 ) displays a statistically significant and positive effect for the growth of the rich (the top 40%) and the reverse for the growth at 10 th and 25 th percentile (although the statistical significance of the latter two is less). Also here, the coefficient increases monotonically as we move from the poor percentiles toward the rich. The Hansen test accepts the hypothesis of orthogonality of the instruments although not with equal strength across the distribution.
When we use separately inequality among the bottom and inequality among the top (Table 6) , the results change slightly compared to the initial formulation. Now, inequality among the bottom 40% does not have a discernable negative effect on their growth rate, but remains positively correlated with the growth rate of the rich. Inequality among the rich still remains bad for the growth of the poor and its effect now extends to the entire lower half of the income distribution. Above that point, inequality among the rich is neutral.
It could be thought that regressions based on anonymous growth rates along different percentiles of the income distribution may introduce an effect whereby growth rates among the poor are spuriously reduced (and those among the rich spuriously increased). We considered this possibility, and in a separate note (available to the reader on request) found that any such spurious effect would lead to exactly the opposite result, that is, it would predict that high initial inequality would help growth for lower incomes while hurting growth for top incomes. 27 This therefore strengthens our findings. 27 An intuitive explanation for such a spurious inequality effect is as follows. When initial inequality is low, the income gaps between households will be small. This makes it more likely for households to switch positions on the income ladder. If a new household now occupies a lower percentile in the income distribution, then it is more likely that this household is a previously higher-ranked household which experienced low growth than a previously lower-ranked household which experienced high growth (in the bottom half there are more households ranked immediately above than below you). So at lower percentiles, low (high) inequality will be associated with low (high) anonymous growth rates, resulting in a spurious positive correlation between growth and initial inequality. The opposite holds true for higher percentiles.
Conclusions
The objective of this paper is to "unpack" both inequality and growth and estimate how different types of inequality may impact subsequent growth at different points of the income distribution. We do this using US micro-census data covering between 1 and 5 percent of the population, at ten-year intervals, over the period 1960-2010. The paper was motivated by two principal concerns: failure to find anything resembling a systematic relationship between inequality and growth in formulations where both inequality and growth were used as single composite variables, and a gradual realization that both variables are much more complex. Inequality is arguably made up of different types; some may be good for growth while others may be bad. The very fact that the earlier literature often found that the sign of the effect switched between positive and negative may be viewed as a hint of this intricate relationship between inequality and growth, with one type of inequality producing one type of effect for one segment of the population, and another type of inequality, with the opposite effect, being more important for another segment of the population.
In the first part of the paper, we keep total inequality as a single variable and look at its effects along US states' income distributions. We find that inequality is negatively associated with subsequent growth rates among the poorer income percentiles, and positively among the higher percentiles.
In the second part of the paper, we decompose total inequality into inequality among the poor (bottom 40%) and the rich (top 40 %). We find that both top and bottom inequalities are negatively associated with real income growth of the poor, but that the bottom inequality is in addition positively associated with the growth of the rich. As the summary in Table 7 shows, these effects are present in all six formulations even if at times their statistical significance varies and the exact ranges of the top and bottom income distributions for which a given type of inequality is bad or good slightly differ.
We cannot test for the channels whereby inequality has such effects, and are reduced to simply proposing some plausible hypotheses. Following other authors (Bénabou, 1996b (Bénabou, , 2000 Lloyd-Ellis, 2000) , we believe that the "social separatism" implied by high inequality among the rich results in their lack of interest in financing many public goods that are crucial for the sustained income growth of the poor. We think that this may be a mechanism explaining why inequality among the rich may have a negative impact on income growth of the poor. More tentatively, we argue that segmentation among the poor (implied by high inequality among them) might provide the rich with opportunities to "exploit" them as a very cheap and pliant labor force unable to command sufficient market wage due perhaps to its insecurity of economic and social status. However, both points are, at this stage, conjectures and their acceptance or rejection clearly requires more empirical and theoretical work.
One avenue for further empirical work would be to experiment with model specifications that include additional explanatory variables that try to capture "social separatism", think of state spending on public education or health, private versus public school enrollment (and test scores), state minimum wage. If higher inequality is associated with government policies that erode the public services the poor depend on for their development, then controlling for public spending on education and health and for indicators that capture the quality of these public services should weaken the correlation between inequality and the future income growth rates of the poor. Alternatively, one could test whether inequality (and inequality among the rich) indeed influences state spending on public goods (and state minimum wages). Yet another extension one could consider is to allow for heterogeneity in the effect of inequality across time and space; one could argue that "social separatism" came into existence in recent decades and may concern some parts of the country more than others. 28 By the same token, it remains to be tested whether channels other than "social separatism" could also be responsible for our findings (e.g., skill-biased technological change and international trade, off-shoring). Table 7 . The effect of inequality among the poor and the rich on income growth among the poor and the rich: a summary ---------Note: number indicates the percentiles to which the effect applies (e.g. ≤10 means that the effect applies to the people whose incomes are equal to, or below, the 10 th percentile). "---" indicates no statistically significant effect.
If our key results hold with other datasets and formulations, they may have both optimistic and pessimistic implications. On the positive side, they should make evident the importance of lower inequality for faster growth of the poor or for a more sustained trickle-down. The "trickle-down" effect and high inequality rather than going together would be shown to exclude each other. On the more pessimistic side, if high inequality is positively associated with income growth of the rich, there is no reason for 28 Notice for example that the South saw its inequality levels decline in the early decades of the period considered here, during which it closed the gap with the rest of the country. the rich to change such a pattern of growth. And since the recent empirical political literature shows that the rich largely control the political process (Page, Bartels and Seawright, 2011; Gilens and Page, 2014) , it is unclear from where the pressure to change would come from. 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 1960 1970 1980 1990 
